In this chapter, I review Korea's legislative framework of free trade agreement negotiations and administration of FTAs. In particular, focus is on the trade in goods, including the administration of rules of origin and tariff reduction chapters of enacted FTAs.
In this chapter, we review Korea's legislative framework of free trade agreement negotiations and administration of FTAs against the backdrop of the increasing need to safeguard due process and democratic participation in the administration of trade policy. In particular, we focus our attention on the trade in goods, including the administration of rules of origin and tariff reduction chapters of enacted FTAs. We also examine the potential areas of disputes involving rules of origin under Korea's FTAs and the mechanisms available to resolve and settle disputes under the domestic implementation laws of FTAs.
II. Framework for FTA Negotiations
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A. Overview
Under the Korean Constitution, the President has the authority to conclude free trade agreements with foreign nations and ratify the treaties. 4 A free trade agreement concluded by the President is presented to the Korean National Assembly which consents to the proposed treaty's ratification. Upon ratification by the President, the treaty is incorporated into the Korean legal system. The treaty has the same level of effectiveness as Korea's national laws. Korea may adopt legislation to effectively implement the treaty, but a national implementing legislation is not required for a treaty to attain the force of legal status.
2 The free trade agreement between the United States and Korea is named the KORUS FTA. policy, the feasibility of concluding an FTA with a given trading partner, the negotiating strategy of an FTA, the effects on the related domestic industry, and the public relations aspects of each FTA. 7 The FTAC is the key inter-governmental organization that coordinates conflicting policy inputs from different ministries during the entire FTA negotiation process. The FTASC may also form a Private Advisory Committee that is composed of experts with extensive experience in international economic relations. 8 The FTA Directive further lays out detailed procedures for the entire process of the FTA: the procedures for formulating FTA policy, the negotiation procedures, and the post-negotiation procedures.
B. Procedures in preparation for FTA negotiations
The MMEEA has the deciding authority as to whether to launch a FTA negotiation.
Before convening the MMEEA meeting and deciding to launch a FTA negotiation, the FTA 
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Directive requires that a public hearing on the proposed FTA negotiation must be held, and the result of the public hearing must be submitted to the MMEEA for deliberation. 9 In all Korean FTAs launched after the enactment of the FTA Directive, the government held public hearings prior to making the decision to launch a FTA negotiation. The public hearing requirement in the FTA Directive is intended to enhance transparency and democratic participation in the FTA policy making.
However, during the preparation for the launch of the KORUS FTA negotiation, the public hearing was suspended by those opposing the launch of the KORUS FTA. Some of the participants opposing the FTA took control of the hearing process, suspending the public hearing. Civic groups criticized the KORUS FTA public hearing as perfunctory because it was held one day before the government announced the decision to launch the negotiation, and was thus portrayed as not genuinely intended to give a hearing to the public's voice. 10 The public hearing procedure has yet to evolve into a quasi-judicial process where the opinions of all stakeholders can be heard and channeled into the policy making process.
In addition to the public hearing, the FTA Committee may commission an economic effects study of a prospective FTA. 11 The economic effects study provides an important economic rationale for launching a FTA negotiation. In addition to the official economic effect study commissioned by the FTA Committee, there are other economic effects study conducted by private as well as government funded think-tanks. In order to bolster the authority of the official economic effects study, the FTA Committee may commission a joint economic effects study with the government of the FTA partner country.
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The joint study must include, among other features, the economic effect of the FTA and the scope of the FTA, the principles and strategies guiding the negotiations, the study of a prospective FTA partner's institutions. The FTA Directive requires that the joint feasibility study shall be authorized by the MMEEA, because the initiation of the joint study with a prospective FTA partner is a significant step towards launching FTA negotiations. The National Assembly can also establish a special committee to monitor the ongoing Before the President ratifies the signed FTA, the National Assembly's consent to the proposed bill is required. Under Article 60 (1) of the Korean Constitution, the National Assembly has the right to consent to the conclusion and ratification of treaties of friendship, trade and navigation. As the FTA is deemed to be a trade treaty that falls under Article 60(1), it requires National Assembly's consent. 17 The domestic procedures are completed when the President's power to conclude and ratify the treaty is checked by the National Assembly's right to consent to the conclusion and ratification of treaties. The FTA becomes effective when it is published in the official gazette.
C. Negotiation Procedures
As an effort to address the burden of market liberalization on some domestic industries through FTAs, the Korean government established the Presidential Commission on Domestic Preparation for Free Trade Agreement (Commission). 18 As an advisory arm of the President, the Commission's responsibility is to successfully facilitate the ratification of the concluded FTAs.
The Presidential FTA Commission mainly deals with domestic policy measures, including policy measures to counter the effects of rapid market liberalization through the enactment of 
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A certificate of origin must be certified by the authority or self-certified by the exporters to ascertain the origin of a product. As a first step to receiving preferential tariff treatment, importers must request an application for an "agreement tariff" from the Korean Customs Service. 37 The agreement tariff is granted to those products originating from the countries with free trade agreements with Korea. 38 Therefore, the Korean Customs Service must determine the origin of the imported product considered for preferential tariff treatment in accordance with the rules of origin provisions of the free trade agreements as described in the implementation acts. 12 which a product is entirely obtained, manufactured, or processed. If more than two countries are involved in production and processing of the product, the following principles are followed.
First, the origin of a product is deemed to be the country where the required change in tariff classification occurs from the materials which go into the final product. Second, the origin of a product is deemed to be the country where the manufacturing and processing generates sufficient valued added to meet the required threshold. Third, the origin of a product is deemed to be the country where certain necessary "specific processing" occurs.
For all FTAs other than the Korea-Chile FTA, the provisions of the FTAs take precedence over the FTA Implementation Act. Article 9 of the FTA Implementation Act expressly states that the origin of an imported and exported product will be determined by the rules under Article 9 as provided in the FTAs. 40 However, in the case of the Korea-Chile FTA, FTAs and the recently concluded KORUS FTA, only the "build-down" method is applied.
Adoption of a single "build-down" criterion reduces ambiguity in origin determination because conflicting origin determinations may result when both "build-up" and "build-down" criteria are used. It should be noted that when both "build-up" and "build-down" criteria are provided, the two values do not necessarily add up to 100%.
In general, the threshold criterion for the value of originating material is specific to a product and is stipulated in the product-specific rules of origin. However, in the Korea-ASEAN FTA Agreement, a general value added criteria applicable to all products is set: the ceiling for the non-originating material is set at 60 percent and the minimum percentage for the value of the originating material is set at 40 percent. 43 Except for those products that are subject to productspecific rules of origin, all other products are subject to the general value added rule.
In calculating the value added criteria, the final product price is based on the f.o.b. 14 Adding further complexity to the rules of origin, the Korea-Singapore FTA also permits a general outward processing: the "build-up" criterion requires that the originating material in the final product must be at least 45% and the "build-down" criterion requires that the non-originating material in the final product must not exceed 40%. 45 Exporters from both Singapore and Korea can take advantage of the rule and there are no restrictions on the eligible products.
The Korea-EFTA FTA also allows outward processing. 46 Notably, the Korea-EFTA FTA rules of origin do not restrict the outward processing region to North Korea. Dual criteria are used to determine whether a product that undergoes outward processing can be deemed as originating from a party. The first rule requires that the value of the originating material exported from the party is not less than 60% of the total value of materials used in manufacturing the re-imported material or product. 47 The second rule requires that the total value of non-originating input does not exceed 40% of the ex-factory price of the product. 48 The second rule is the usual value added rule based on the final price of the product, while the first rule imposes threshold on the non-originating material that can be added outside the party's territory as a percentage of the total materials used in manufacturing the re-imported material.
This rule is an incorporation of Korea's domestic regulation stipulated in the Ministry of
Unification Notice on the tariff-free treatment of goods imported from North Korea.
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The Korea-ASEAN FTA rules of origin also permit a party to confer origin to products that undergoes outward processing. Criteria similar to the criteria adopted in the Korea-EFTA FTA is also adopted in this case: the value of the originating material shall not be less than 60% of the total value of the materials used in manufacturing the re-imported material and the total value of non-originating input shall not exceed 40% of the f.o.b. price of the product. 50 Each ASEAN country provides the list of goods for which it permits application of the outward processing criteria to confer origin status. 51 It is noteworthy that the Korean implementing from a party incorporated in the production of the goods in another party will be considered originating from the latter party in which the final good is produced.
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The accumulation provision in Korea's FTAs is not considered a full "territorial accumulation". For example, if the material incorporated into the final product is not determined to be originating from a party, the entire material will be considered non-originating regardless of the percentage of the originating content in it. Under full territorial accumulation, the whole areas covered by a given FTA are considered as one single territory; thus, any working or processing done in the single territory will be counted towards the determination of origin.
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Variations in the rules of origin across different FTAs potentially lead to disputes over interpretation of the rules. An example of this is the "transshipment" provision, which is one of the fundamental provisions provided in all the Korean FTAs, but which varies significantly across the different FTA types. Article 9.2 of the FTA Implementation Act provides that even if a product is otherwise determined to originate from an FTA party, if a product is transshipped through a country other than the originating country or loaded in countries other than the originating country, the product will be denied the origin of the FTA party. 55 However, if the goods are transshipped for the purpose of transportation or unloaded in bonded areas in a third party's territory, the product will not be denied the origin of the FTA party.
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The Korea-Chile FTA provides the "transshipment" provision, which is implemented through the Korea-Chile FTA Implementation Regulation. Article 12 of the Korea-Chile FTA Implementation Regulation adds the qualification that the product has to remain under the control or observation of the customs authority in the territory of the non-party during 52 Importantly, Korea expressed its understanding that the outward processing can take place only in the Gaesong Industrial authority fraudulently or in bad faith in order to receive "agreement tariffs". 63 The law also permits imposition of a penalty of 30 million Won or less than three years of imprisonment for persons convicted of disclosing to others the information submitted to the authority for origin determination, or for using the information for purposes other than origin determination. The Seoul Customs Office determined on the basis of available evidence that the products were shipped to France for the purpose of commercial sale in France and were not intended for "transshipment". Critical to the case was the fact that importer did not import directly from the Chilean producer, Vina Almaviva. Instead, the importer imported from a middleman located in Europe. 71 The bill of lading and the invoice for the export indicated the shipper and the exporter to be "Grands Vins de Gironde" in Europe. On the basis of the above evidence, therefore, the Seoul Customs Office affirmed the determination that the product is not originating from Chile, as the products were transshipped to a non-party's territory for sale in that territory.
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V. Conclusion
Korea's administration FTAs needs to be improved to allow effective participation of the public and to enhance procedural fairness in FTA policy making process. To channel interest group voices to the decision making process behind the launch of FTA negotiations, the public hearings should become more than mere formalities. A government organized public hearing
should not turn into a venue for demonstrators against FTA negotiations. To improve the substantive contribution of the public hearing process, the decision to launch a FTA negotiation should be based on inputs including those from the public hearing for a FTA. In addition, a reasonable period of time should pass after the public hearing before the decision to launch a FTA negotiation could be made.
Inter-governmental policy coordination should also be improved. The institutional roles played by the MMEEA in arbitrating the differences in inter-ministry views on FTA policies should be reestablished. The lack of inter-ministry coordination mechanism would seriously hamper Korea's FTA negotiating ability. 
